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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GORDON LEE KIESEL, 
vs. 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
No.. 16806 
EVELYN MARIE KIESEL, 
Defendant-
Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This controversy arises from the Motion made by defendant to modify 
a 1974 Divorce Decree for the purpose of increasing child support. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At the hearing held upon defendant's Motion, the Honorable Don V. 
Tibbs entered an Order modifying the Decree by increasing child support 
from a total of $125.00 to a total of $250.00. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Respondent requests this Court to affirm the award of 
child support as to both of the parties' children. 
STATE:MENT OF FACTS 
On October 16, 1974, a Decree of Divorce was entered dissolving 
1 
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the marriage of the parties and ordering piaintiff to pay child support to 
his child Marsha Kaye Kiesel in the amount of $75.00 per month and support 
to his child Mary Ann Kiesel in the amount of $50.00 per month. (R-30) 
On August 15, 1979, defendant filed a Petition for Modification 
seeking continued support for Marsha and an increase in the amount of support 
for both Marsha and Mary. The hearing on this request was held on September 
26, 1979-
At the time of the hearing, Marsha was 19 years old. (R-142). She 
is a very special child. She is retarded at a third or fourth grade level 
(R-129, 137) and suffers from severe epilectic seizures at which time she 
looses control of her body functions. (R-129, 132). Because of these 
afflictions she requires constant supervision. (R-137, 156, 157). 
In 1978 the child scalded herself which has resulted in permanent 
scars and injuries. (R-139, 157). 
As a result of her afflictions and burns, she requires continual 
medi.cal attention and medication, which includes special nylon body suits, 
burn creams and tranquilizers. (R-132, 135, 143, 144). 
Presently she is enrolled at the Nebo Training Center for retarded 
children. (R-131). 
Mary Kiesel, at the time of the hearing, was 16 years old and 
enrolled in high school. Her school and clothing expenses have increased 
over the requirements she had at age 12 when the divorce was entered. 
(R-146, 151, 152). 
The defendant, Evelyn Marie Kiesel has nominal income as an Avon 
sales person (R-169), but is unable to obtain full time employment because 
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of the necessity to care for Marsha (R-156). Presently she also receives 
welfare assitance (R-153). 
The plaintiff, Gordon Lee Kiesel, is employed as the Chief of 
Police of the city of Salina (R0171). At the time the Decree of Divorce 
was entered he was earning $850.00 per month. By January of 1978, he was 
earning $1,029.62 (R-127), and as of the time of the hearing has earned 
$10,042.95 as chief of police (R-172). 
In addition to his salary as chief of police, plaintiff has derived 
additional income from his trucking business. In 1977 plaintiff and his 
wife had an adjusted gross income of $29,898.00, of which $5,287.42 repres-
ented his wife's income. (De~endant's Exhibit 3). Although in 1978 plain-
tiff showed a loss on his tax return, a substantial part was represented 
by salaries and depreciation. (Defendant's Exhibit 4). Plaintiff testified 
further that he expected a similar loss- in 1979 from his trucking business, 
but he also testified that he was going to turn the business over to his 
sons, so that they could make it a workable operation. (R-175, 176). 
) 
The trial court found Marsha to be a special child with physical 
and mental deficiencies which required continued support, and found further 
that there had been a change of circumstances justifying an increase of 
child support for both children (R-113, 114, 117). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT DID JUSTIFY THE COURT'S MODIFICATION 
OF THE DECREE: 
3 
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At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated: 
The Court finds that in 1977 Mr. Kiesel remarried and that 
he and his spouse together, as shown by Exhibit No. 3, had 
an adjusted gross income of $29,898. The Court finds there 
was a loss in 1978 but the Court finds that a substantial 
part of that was depreciation. The Court finds that based 
upon the taxes of 1979, there would be in excess of $30,000 
depreciation which would offset the loss that Mr. Kiesel 
testified to. 
The Colirt finds that there has been an increase in Mr. 
Kiesel's gross earnings to date of $10,042.95 and the 
Court finds that Mrs. Kiesel has nominal earnings, and the 
Court finds that this is a special child and the record is 
replete all the way through, right from the commencement 
of this divorce action, concerning the fact that this child 
would require special education and special care for the 
balance of her life and the Court is of the opinion that 
Mrs. Kiesel is needed in the home to take care of her and 
maintain her and do the best she can with her. 
The Court finds that there has been a change of circumstances. 
As to Mary, the support money is increased to $100 a month 
and to the minor child, Marsha, that the support should 
continue and the support rate is set for $150.00 per month. 
(R-186, 187). 
Plaintiff-Appellant now wishes to make much ado over the first 
quot·ed paragraph arguing in effect that the court erred in considering his 
wife's income and failed to give enough consideration to his 1978 and 1979 
losses which were based to a great extent on depreciation losses. 
In fact, apart from his wife's additional income, plaintiff has 
received an increase in salary as chief of police from $850.00 per month 
in 1974 to $1,057.00 at the time of the hearing (R-100, 1973). In addition 
to that increase in salary, plaintiff in 1977 earned $11,155.57 from his 
trucking business, (Defendant's Exhibit 3) and, while plaintiff showd a 
loss in 1979, it is important to point out, as did the trial court, that 
a large portion of that loss is represented by depreciation. 
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Plaintiff in argument now wishes to make a great deal over the 
theoretical out-of-pocket losses sustained by him but he overlooks two 
important factors. First, while for tax purposes he can depreciate his 
trucks over a six year life, it is erroneous to assume that after depreci-
ation the vehicles have no value. This assumption is inherrent in his 
argument. (Defendant's Exhibit 3). Secondly, it is only a short term 
problem because plaintiff testified that he was going to turn his trucking 
business over to his sons, so that they could make it an operative business. 
(R-176). The record is unclear as to whether he will sell it or give it 
to them, but the result is the same, he will no longer be faced with these 
losses. 
It is interesting to note too, that while plaintiff argues that 
he suffered "out-of-pocket losses of some $20,000.00 in 1978" (Appellant's 
Brief - 8) he testified that he was able to spend $3,000.00 during this same 
year on recreational property for himself and his sons (R-184). A figure 
some $600.00 in excess over the $2,400.00 he has been ordered by the trial 
court to pay in support of his children. 
An increase in a father's ability to support his children is only 
one factor for the trial court to consider in trying to determine if there 
has been a material change of circumstances to justify an increase in child 
support. Equally important to consider is when there is a showing of in-
creased needs of the children such as when the children grow older and re-
quire additional support to properly maintain them. (Wright v. Wright, 
586 P.2d 443 (Utah 1978} at 445 and Owen v. Owen, 579 P.2d 911 (Utah 1978) 
at 913). Such is the situation in the present case. Since the Decree of 
5 
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Divorce was entered, Mary, age 16, is now enrolled in high school and her 
clothing and school expenses having increased over her needs at age 12 and 
the $50.00 per month child support is not enough to meet these increased 
needs. (R-146, 151, 152). 
Marsha's needs have not only increased as a result of her growing 
older, but also as a result of a burn accident which has permanently in-
jured her so that she requires continual medical treatment, clothing and 
medication (R-132, 135, 139, 143, 144, 157). 
Plaintiff's argument that he be relieved of his obligation to 
support his children because defendant receives social security supplements 
and state welfare allotments is completely without merit. This court has 
said in a similar context: 
In a divorce action, the courts are already injected into 
the affairs of the family in determining the needs of the 
children and parent's ability to.provide between them-
selves for the needs of all. The courts need flexibility in 
re-arranging the obligations as new needs arise; and the pur-
pose of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Sec. 15-2-1 is to give 
the courts latitude·· in determining whether exigent circum-
stances exist which necessitate further support of dependent 
children rather than allowing them to become dependant on 
the state. (Emphasis added) HARRIS v. HARRIS, 585 p.2d 
435 (Utah 1978) at 436. 
The trial court was not as naive or arbitrary as the plaintiff would 
like to believe. When faced with the total circumstances surrounding the 
plaintiff's earning ability, the defendant's limited earning capacity and 
need to continually supervise Marsha, Mary's increased needs and Marsha's 
special needs, the trial court did the only rational thing it could do 
by entering its order. Certainly the record supports the trial court's 
! 
finding and to argue that the evidence so preponderates against the trial ' 
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court's finding that an inequity or an injustice has resulted is perposter-
ous. This court has said in setting forth the standards under which it will 
review the evidence and make its own findings: 
It is to be appreciated that family relations and problems 
are often suffused with such complexity that reasonable 
minds may arrive at difference solutions to them. Whether 
the justices of this Court, or any particular justice, 
would have arrived at the same conclusion as the trial 
judge, or whether some other trial judge would have done 
so is not the test of its validity. Giving effect to the 
perogative and the responsibility of the trial judge as 
hereinabove set forth, we are not persuaded.that he abused 
his discretion, nor that such an/inequity or injustice re-
sulted that we should distur..b his finding and judgment. 
OWEN v. OWEN, Supra at 913. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT MARSHA WAS A RETARDED CHILD 
INCAPABLE OF PROVIDING FOR HERSELF AND REQUIRING SPECIALIZED CARE AND WAS 
CORRECT IN ORDERING PLAINTIFF TO PAY SUPPORT FOR HER BEYOND THE AGE OF 21. 
The trial court found that Marsha was a special child, unable to 
care for herself ude to her physi~al and mental deficiencies, which rendered 
her wholly dependant upon the defendant for her daily needs and care, and that 
she was in need of special schooling and medical treatment. (R0114). This 
fact is not disputed by the plaintiff nor is the fact that this court in 
Dehn v. Dehn, 585 P.2d (Utah 1976) 525 has already ruled that a trial court 
has the authority to require support and maintenance of retarded children 
beyond their age of majority. (Appellant's Brief - 15). 
What the plaintiff wants, however, is for this Court to overrule 
the Dehn case and vacate the trial court's Order requiring support for Marsha 
beyond age 21. He argues that the decisions in Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 
7 (1975) and Harris v. Harris, 585 P.2d (Utah 1978) 435 are dispositive. In 
7 
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fact, neither case is in point or analogous to the Dehn decision. 
The United States Supreme Court in the Stanton case held that Section 
15-21-1 was unconstitutuional in that two separate ages were established for 
males and females with no justifiable reason for the classification. 
The Harris case dealt with the issue of whether under Section 15-2-1 
U.C.A. (1953) the court could order continuing support.for a child until age 
21 when unusual circumstances justify it. The Court specifically excepted fro: 
the decision the question of support of adult children mentally or physically 
incapable of caring for themselves. Ibid. at 436. 
This case is clearly and unquestionably in point with the Dehn case. 
In the Dehn case the subject children were mentally and physically retarded, 
requiring specialized care and unable to provide for their personal and fin~· 
cial responsibilities. (bid. at 526. Such is the identical situation with 
Marsha. 
Plaintiff's argument has already been considered and rejected by this 
Court in the Dehn case. The determination that trial courts should have broad 
equitable powers in safeguarding the interests and welfare of disabled or 
incompetant adult children is sound and should not be disturbed. 
CONCLUSION 
It is fundamental that the trial court's decision cannot be disturbed 
unless it appears that the evidence so preponderates against the trial court's 
findings that inequity or injustice results, and then and only then may this 
court make its own findings and substitute its judgment for that of the trial 
court. Owen v. Owen, Supra at· 913. The evidence aduced at the hearing in thi 
matter clearly supports the trial court's findings that there had been a mater 
change in circumstances in the needs of the _children since the date of the Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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Decree and further shows that the trial court was correct in continuing 
support for Marsha and increasing the a.mount of support as to both children. 
For these reasons the OTder should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted. 
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